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I would like to offer you a short journey, starting from here and ending in Italy, my country, and at the end 
of this journey I hope i twill be clear that sometimes there are weddings that it’s much better not to 
celebrate. A brilliant Italian economist, Professor Alberto Bagnai, even wrote a short novel: “the story of 
Hans Center and Maria Periphery” forecasting what will came in the future should we insist to keep this 
engagement for too long, and the consequences will be dire. There is nothing wrong in friendship, 
sometimes it could turn into a wedding  but more often than not it is better to stay friends. For Europe this 
is the case. 
Let’s start in the nineties: the EMS was a proxy of the euro, with almost fixed currency rates. This situation 
quickly start creating an heavvy trade deficit in Italy, the outflow in currency was tackled exactly with the 
wrong tools we are using today: a sharp tax hike (government even taxed bank deposits overnight, levying 
a percentage of every Italian positive balance on their banking accounts), rise in interest rates up to 18% 
and the very same rethoric we are hearing today about the disaster of an EMS exit. As you maybe 
remember, after having depleted all the Bank of Italy’s foreign currency reserves, eventually Italy was 
forced to abandon EMS devaluating the lira around 20%. 
As you can see in this table the rebound on trade balance has been almost immediate, and paved the way 
for the last “Italian miracle” of the nineties, the very last growth period Italy witnessed.  
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Please note the balance of euro states trade: Italy in surplus, Germany deficit. Another world indeed. 
Consider that Italian public debt was not different than today, but it was not a matter of concern, the shock 
did reflect on the exchange rate, no one was thinking about selling government bonds under par. Note also 
that most of the terrible consequences  envisaged for an EMS exit by the very same names (one of the most 
vocal was Mr Mario Monti himself) that warn about the doom of an eur exit (banking crashes, 
hyperinflation, impossibility to buy oil and basic materials) never happened in the slightest. Inflation even 
dropped 0,5% compared with previous year.  
Then come the Euro and Italy was successfully lured in the same trap. After having blocked again the 
natural balancing tool represented by floating exchange rates, the ghost of the trade deficit come back with 
multiplied power and this time euro-wide 
  
I think that this table does not need any comment. One could dig deep in the reasons of Germany’s boom. 
Evidence is that it’s the outcome of an aggressive salary control that widened the competitive gap with 
euro periphery, whose deficits were filled with an huge flow of capital invested by core Europe in the now 
“currency risk free” countries. Capital flow drove inflation up, widening even more the competitive gap, 
and fueling an out-of-control private debt rise that crushed most of Euro periphery countries. Please check 
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the following graph: red is gdp% shift in private debt and blue public debt from 1999 to 2007, so much for 
another of the myths of this crisis, the one that says that “the fault is of the public debt” 
 
  
What went wrong? Nothing strange, in fact another outcome was very unlikely because Eurozone violated 
openly the basic requirements for an Optimal Currency Area and eventually Euro turned out to be nothing 
more than the usual currency peg trap for the weak countries leading to a classic Frenkel’s cycle. The tax 
hike imposed to an already tax plagued economy like Italy’s one crushed the economy and the higher take 
went to northern Europe creditors via Esfs and loans to Greece and other periphery countries. Italy had 
almost zero exposure to peripheric Europe debt. 
It is possible to understand the dangerousness of the situation if only we think that in a normal situation a 
shock in a country determines a drop of its currency, thus an help for its economy. In Eurozone we were 
able to build the monster of a system that worsen the condition of an area under shock, driving its 
borrowing cost higher. 
Let’s now move to solutions and why the “more Europe” option is negated by Italy’s example.  
Almost everyone agrees that there are only three ways out for this situation: Euro breakup; sharp deflation 
via wage cut in periphery (possibly twinned by a rise in prices in Germany)@ and the “more Europe” 
mantra. From Krugman downwards there is a qualified consensus that deep deflation is not realistic, 
socially but also economically, due to the worsening of the debt burden should gdp fall more. So let’s take a 
look of what Italy example can tell about the forced full integration of different economic areas. 
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Italy is an extremely interesting case study on integration, because it encompasses areas very different as 
per their economic strength. We can say that the common currency “lira” unified a German North Italy, A 
France Center and a Greek South, with the advantage of a common language. How the equilibrium has 
been obtained? In the only possible way for a non Optimal Currency Area, via deep internal fiscal transferts. 
This means that in order to replicate “Italian model” Germany should pay for the others like north Italy 
does for the rest of the country, but even should this situation be politically manageable (and I suspect it’s 
not) this is not desirable at all, exactly following what went wrong in Italy. 
To make the point simple: imagine that economic and industrial strength of North Italy is “10” and the 
same level should be given of a theorical “northern” currency, while the one of the south is “2”. The 
currency “lira” will trade as an average of the two area, let’s say “6”. The result is that the North gets a 
weaker currency compared with its strength, and the south a stronger one. Industries in the north so 
become very competitive and export their success in world markets and also in the internal one while in 
the south factories closes by the day, keeping alive only sectors out of competition (Tourism, quality food) 
not nearly enough to be self sufficient. Very soon it appears evident that the South situation was 
unsustainable and programs to “relaunch” South economy started to drain money from the North, taking 
back most of its trade surplus. Tax rate started to rise, in a sharply progressive way, in order to hit the 
successful Northern industry and to make up resources to fund the needs of a starving south and the 
equilibrium was set. 
You see the cycle? The North is competitive thanks to a weaker currency, it piles up extra profits and these 
profits are drained to pay the South who have its growth made impossible by the too strong currency. I can 
imagine that many German industries saw only the competition side of north Italy industries, not knowing 
that on the other hand they were burdened by the weight of taxes and limits, without any aid from the 
State, without decent infrastructure, because most of the money were drained away to settle the 
imbalance.  
What happened of the money sent South? Many attempts has been made to create industries with heavy 
incentives to set up business, but if there is no “real” economic interest in keeping a plant open and the ony 
reason to do so is the state financing, the result is that no serious investment is made, because the flow of 
money from the state could end in any moment, as it is set every year with the budget law.  
In most cases the answer has been to simply create jobs out of thin air, with a disproportionate number of 
civil servants. Many analyst point out funny situation, like the fact that it seems that in the small region of 
Calabria there are more Forest guardians than in the whole Canada. The state quickly become the main 
employer of the South. The unintended consequence of having a steady flow of money (around 50 billion 
per year as an average, but the number is higher if we consider services) intermediated by the state from 
North to South is the creation of a corrupt net of politics and state managers who aim to profit from the 
huge decisional power of allocating resources. The trade “jobs for votes” become quickly rooted in 
southern Italy culture when it become clear that there were no realistic chances to compete with “normal” 
economic activities. 
Needles to say that even this flawed equilibrium was shattered by the euro. Once the country got the very 
same “10” currency of the rest of the Europe, Northern Italian industries competitiveness fell sharply but 
their strength would have been enough to stay in the market, sadly the burden for the internal money 
transfers was still firmly in place, so even if it has been masked for a while by cheap capital inflows the 
weakness eventually made them snap. Of course if the hurdle for the “2” southern economy to reach the 
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“6” lira strength standard was almost impossible, the next hurdle of the “10” strong Euro erased even the 
slightest chance of success. 
It should be clear that becoming a big economic Italy it is not desirable for Europe, neither from the side of 
the ones that will have to pay nor from the point of view of the ones who will be forced to seek aid. A 
“southernization” of Europe is the last thing we need, it’s inefficient, paves the way to corruption and fuels 
hate between people, who will see only their money taken away but failing to grasp the whole picture. The 
only realistic way out is to set up currency areas better shaped, where economies are free to rise and fall 
for their own strength, not for a dirigistic system of internal money transfers. Splitting the euro area in two 
itcould well be a first step towards a future of deep friendship between Europeans, without getting into the 
abyss of hate often created by an ill-conceived wedding. 
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